Sunday, 27 May 2018

Belt and Road opportunities


Brexiters dream of trade deals with the biggest markets such as China, but what can we do in the meantime if a full trade agreement with China is some way off? An interesting tweet appeared on Friday, from the Permanent Secretary at the Department of International Trade, Liam Fox's top civil servant. $1.8bn of business opportunities is not to be sniffed at, but what are we actually talking about here?

As the tweet says, we already do £67.5bn of trade (exports + imports, 2017) with China, and £1.8bn is less than 3% of that. It might be worth a bit more to the UK in the long run if the estimate is for new exports, especially services. And the long run is important. One Belt, One Road is a huge, vague initiative taking in more than half the world's people and nearly half of the world's GDP as of today.

"'It means everything and it means nothing at the same time,' said Christopher Balding, a professor of economics at Peking University." So there you have it. It's China's new trade policy, it's a "philosophy" or a "party line", it's a way for China to get into every country in Eurasia (with Africa on the side). "'China is looking to use OBOR as a way to ship its own domestic overproduction offshore,' said Nick Marro, an analyst with the Economist Intelligence Unit".

Map and quotes above from "Just what is this One Belt, One Road thing anyway?

OK, so it's big. And we might get 3% or so more trade than we currently do with China out of all that business in all those countries. As I responded to Ms Romeo on Friday, that's "hardly ambitious". I assume it's £1.8bn per year by the way.

The link in her tweet is to "A guide for British businesses interested in selling goods and services in China" which is presumably the place to start for a British business interested in branching out. I'd recommend you give the department a ring as well, though, because they organise trade trips to places like China, and they have a Minister of State with some business experience (one Rona Fairhead, sometime chair of the BBC Trust and director of HSBC) who's written a piece called "Why China’s Belt and Road offers the UK huge opportunities" which starts in some familiar places:

"China’s middle class is expected to number 600 million by 2020 – greater than the current entire population of the EU. This too offers fantastic potential for UK businesses looking to sell their goods and services in China, as illustrated by the £9.8 billion worth of trade deals signed by the International Trade Secretary Dr Liam Fox’s visit to China and the Prime Minister earlier this year [this is a bit garbled, but I know what she means]. These deals covered a range of sectors, including energy, education and financial services, and included major new investments into the UK."

£9.8bn of trade deals eh? That'll be over several years presumably, and it's not just exports, but even so £1.8bn isn't very exciting next to it. Indeed, Fox told the Guardian on that very trade trip that "Chinese e-commerce sellers had signed up to sell £2bn worth of UK goods over the next two years". Do you suppose Antonia Romeo missed a zero or two out?

Oh, and is any of that business actually dependent on Brexit in any way? We're doing business now. What does being an EU member prevent us doing? The headline of the Guardian piece is "Liam Fox admits being in EU doesn't stop more trade with China". A Chinese businessman, as reported by the BBC on 31 January 2018 during Fox and May's trip, told us that the UK has seen his country only as a trading partner, whereas Germany has worked with China in strategic economic areas. Unsurprisingly, the Germans do more trade with China than we do, and last time I looked Germany was a member of the EU.






Friday, 18 May 2018

Pesky facts and knowledge!


“It makes no sense for the UK to continue to impose taxes on New World wines, coffee, rice and thousands of other products, and then to send the proceeds to Brussels. The EU masquerades as a free trade organisation, but it is really a protection racket which imposes import taxes on the 93% of the world's population that is not in the EU.”

So says Tim Martin, chair of Wetherspoons. By that measure the USA is a protection racket which imposes import taxes on the 96% of the world's population that are not US residents. Donald Trump appears to be making a similar case in this conversation with the Secretary General of NATO, as discussed by an EU foreign policy specialist:




Read the whole thread, but snippets such as 'EU import duties on passenger cars are 10%; US duties are 2.5%. But the US market is far more reliant on pickups and trucks, and here the US charges 25% duties as opposed to the EU's 10%' and 'those BMWs and Mercedes "pouring into the United States" - BMW's largest car plant IN THE WORLD is in South Carolina, producing 450,000 vehicles a year' might come in useful.


Dan Hannan, hard at work in the EU Parliament
And then, what did Martin say about New World wines? I remember something from a man the media keep calling an "arch-Brexiteer" - Daniel Hannan MEP. He's deleted the tweets in question (wonder why), but the Mirror tells the story. The British Retail Consortium warned international trade minister Laim Fox that "shop prices on a range of goods would go up considerably if Britain was forced to default to World Trade Organisation rules".

Hannan protested: claims that the price of Chilean wine (a New World product he is apparently fond of) would rise by 14% on Brexit were "idiotic" because, after all, it would no longer be subject to a 35% EU-wide import tariff on wines. And he was immediately reminded (by people who haven't deleted their tweets) that the EU has a free trade agreement with Chile, so no tariff on their wine. In fact:

  • The general tariff on wine actually seems to be "about 8p a bottle"
  • We've been paying Hannan to represent some of us in the EU parliament for 19 years now. Has he learned nothing?
  • And another thing - "European Commission deputy Brexit negotiator Sabine Weyand said that London will need permission from all of Europe’s more than 40 trade partners to stay in agreements during the post-Brexit transitional period. She revealed that two countries - South Korea and Chile - had already raised objections", so Mr Hannan can't yet be sure his post-Brexit Chilean wine will still be tariff-free.
Dan Hannan has done this kind of thing several times, objecting to an apparently terrible tariff on a product from a third world country which turns out to be very, very wrong or non-existent (and people have learned to keep images of his tweets as evidence when he inevitably deletes them).

****

David Miliband "intervened" in the ongoing Brexit debate this week and it brought a celebrated image to Hannan's mind (among many others, I'm sure).

But young Daniel couldn't resist one of his forays into tariff-hunting. This time he was taken apart by Essex University's Professor of EU, Human Rights and World Trade Law.




Again, a quick extract: "The link which Hannan himself provides points out that there are no tariffs on bananas from African, Caribbean and Pacific countries". Could those perhaps include a lot of bananas from the Commonwealth?

****

Returning to Tim Martin's list of concerns, let's look at coffee. Nadine Dorries MP puts her head up every now and then - in February it was to claim that "Roasted coffee beans have duty applied to prevent poorer countries from creating an industry of processing. British pay, German and Italian roasters benefit - the countries that produce the beans, remain poor".

Here, Jim Cornelius takes us through step by step for the top ten coffee producing nations in Africa, concluding with "Eight of them are on zero tariff. One is on a reduced tariff and only one, Gabon, is on the full tariff for roasted coffee. An EPA [Economic Partnership Agreement] is in the pipeline that will reduce this to zero".




In general, therefore, products from the poorest countries normally attract no tariffs on imports under the EU's Everything But Arms scheme, reduced or zero tariffs under the EU's Generalised System of Preferences, or zero tariffs under an actual free trade agreement.

Here's a list of people who get things wrong:
  • Tim Martin
  • Dan Hannan
  • Nadine Dorries
And here's a list of people who put them right, by actually knowing things and doing research:
  • Chris Kendall
  • Steve Peers
  • Jim Cornelius

Guess who gets paid to get things wrong (all of them) and to get things right (Chris Kendall and Steve Peers). Now guess who you're more likely to see or hear on the news (the wrong group).

And in case you were wondering about that point at the top, the US being just like the EU as a "tariff-charging protection racket", here's a chart showing the average tariffs charged (weighted by actual trade) by the EU (including the UK), the US and Australia. Tariffs will be higher and lower on some products than others, in one country compared with another, but the overall effect isn't all that different.




Sunday, 13 May 2018

Don't worry, we've got ten years


Jacob Rees Mogg
adopting the Belgian bargee look
which some will liken to Lenin
(Image Ben Cawthra/LNP)
It's all over lots of timelines, but what brought me back to zyxpwf was one of my contacts informing me that "JR-M has exposed the fundamental flaw behind May's entire Brexit negotiation strategy: there's a guaranteed 10yr 'cost-free' tariff-free transition deal available just by going to WTO-only next March. WTF she's been handing money & everything else over for, Lord alone knows".

I'd seen the man himself on Daily Politics (starting at about 17:30), in his cut fudge accent, assuring those of us who just don't understand that "The House of Lords has missed one very important thing. That is that if you are in a negotiation for a free trade agreement you can maintain your existing standards for ten years under WTO rules... So we have ten years from the moment in which we leave the European Union to negotiate a free trade agreement with the EU which would mean we could carry on with our zero tariffs".

Oh really, I thought, I know Big Jake always delivers his debating points pre-packaged on tablets of stone, but you'd think such a slam-dunk would be pretty useful ammunition for - ooh, to pluck a name from the air - David Davis, Laim Fox, even Theresa May on a day when she wasn't fire-fighting some Grenfell or Windrush scandal. You'd think it would be the basis of the UK negotiating position.

It isn't. They never mention it. Could it be less than a slam-dunk?

I sent a query out into the social media ether: "Can you point me at relevant parts of the WTO rule book?" and waited. "Sounds like a strange interpretation of ART XXIV GATT and interim agreements to me," Benjamin Thorn told me, so I started reading.

Some tweeters (inhabitants of my jungle of choice) seem to start from the JRM position and... just stay there. "It's remarkable that this isn't better known" said one, to which I responded "If it should be better known, find the link to the relevant WTO rule and share it". Nothing.

"JRM just keeps producing plain common sense solutions almost on a daily basis." said somebody. "No hysterics, always in control, well researched and clarity in speech. Like him or loath him he is the leader that Mrs May is not. His understanding of the complexities of Brexit is second to none." It must be useful to have a hero. Even if it's Big Jake Mogg.

I take my lead on this from Jim Cornelius - this is "about an interim arrangement of a new FTA/CU" and "It's got nothing to do with any previously existing arrangement. It's surely about a sensible limit to the delay between interim agreement becoming a firm agreement, and it's conditions applying during that period".

I look to the Professor of EU, Human Rights and World Trade Law at Essex University - "Isn't this the old ERG misunderstanding of Article XXIV GATT?" - and a reader in international law at Cambridge University who also happens to be a Senior Counsel at Linklaters, the "Global Law Firm" - "It’s amazing how this awful misinterpretation of Art XXIV GATT won’t die, no matter how many times I point this out" - and I conclude that Article 24 concerns ways of working if you are in the process of establishing an agreement, requiring you to proceed by agreement and according to conditions.

I don't see a glibly specified allowance of time during which nobody needs to worry or - apparently - do anything.
https://twitter.com/StevePeers/status/995324280270401537

https://twitter.com/Jim_Cornelius/status/995341588632096768
https://twitter.com/Jim_Cornelius/status/995341588632096768
https://twitter.com/Jim_Cornelius/status/995341588632096768https://twitter.com/Jim_Cornelius/status/995341588632096768


Thursday, 29 March 2018

You're joking. Not another one!


Could there be another Brexit referendum?

Let's get one thing straight. Another referendum would not be illegitimate. Several polls indicate that a majority of British people want a chance to vote on whatever deal May & co finally come to. The idea that it would be an affront to the will of the people as expressed on one day to ask the same electorate a different but related question two and a half years later when we all know far more is just ridiculous.

It would not be "like Ireland, being asked again and again until they get the right answer". (And the second Irish vote on the Lisbon treaty, for example, was not on exactly the same question as the first, since an extra protocol had been negotiated, ensuring that "Irish policies on tax, abortion and military neutrality would not be affected by Ireland ratifying the treaty" to address the Irish electorate's fears.)

****

May has promised a "meaningful vote" in Parliament at the end of the negotiations. She has also promised that the British Parliament will get a chance to vote before the EU Parliament begins its considerations. The options in that vote are currently presented as a take it or leave it - if you don't like what we've concluded with the EU27, we'll just drop out with no deal and take the consequences (which is such a stupid idea that it should have been laughed out of court already).

Labour and others are trying to amend the EU Withdrawal Bill, currently going through the House of Lords, to make the choices more reasonable and the vote more "meaningful". "Our amendment would make it clear that, should the prime minister's deal be defeated, it must be for Parliament to say what happens next, not the executive," says Keir Starmer. Other amendments would insert an option to withdraw the Article 50 notification and remain in the EU, or to make the operation of the bill subject to a vote by the British electorate.

There are campaigns, such as the Lib Dems' "Exit from Brexit" - a vote "once a 'clear picture' emerges of the outcome of the Brexit talks", and Best for Britain's "People's Vote on Brexit", but at present Labour seem likely to whip their members in the Lords (and later their MPs, as necessary) against anything but their own amendment, which might win backing from other parties, and might leave the Commons looking around at each other some time in October or November, saying "OK, now what?".

Before the referendum, Leave campaigners seemed happy to consider a further referendum "on the terms of Brexit". Dominic Cummings, campaign director for Vote Leave, told the Economist in January 2016 that "there's a strong democratic case for it" and John Redwood wrote in 2012 (following David Davis) of a "double referendum on the EU" where two questions would be asked:

  1. Do you want the UK government to negotiate a new relationship with the EU based on trade and political co-operation?"
  2. "Do you want to accept the new negotiated relationship with the EU or not? Voting No means withdrawing from the EU."

Cummings was considering what leadership candidates to replace David Cameron might offer to their Tory party electorate, and Redwood's choice was Out-with-a-deal versus Out-with-no-deal, but neither they nor Davis considered a confirmatory referendum outlandish, undemocratic or illegitimate.

****

But when could a "second referendum", or "the first vote on the facts" take place? The discussion above suggests that a new referendum could follow a vote in the UK parliament on a withdrawal treaty brought back from the EU summit on 22 October by a triumphant or resigned May and Davis. But would it have to wait for the EU parliament to accept or reject that treaty? You can't sensibly vote for a deal that's just been rejected by MEPs (including our own), and there's little point in voting for it if the MEPs then go on to reject it.

And what would the question be? Could there be a popular vote on May's preferred choice between her deal and no deal? Or would it have to be a multiple choice voting paper?
  • Accept the withdrawal agreement
  • Reject the withdrawal agreement and leave the EU with no agreed relationship and no transition (what used to be called the WTO option, or "crashing out on WTO terms", but would also mean no agreement on trade in services, security cooperation and many other things) 
  • Remain in the EU
Or would Starmer's informed and empowered parliament decide the bleedin' obvious, that no deal is the worst deal of all and make it Deal v Remain? And would the Europhobic Corbyn whip (many of) his parliamentary party against that? There would certainly be opposition.

Accepting the withdrawal agreement at this point would mean proceeding to transition and negotiation of a final trade and security relationship (which might or might not all work within the agreed transition period, though the ever-optimistic David Davis tells Andrew Neil for the Spectator that "the UK and the EU will ‘get pretty substantively close’ to a free trade agreement by October").

Rejecting it and opting for Remain would see two years of legislative effort torn up, and No Deal would leave us making things up as we went along.

****

Assuming that the decision to run a referendum was taken, what would have to be done? Referendums are still not a standard part of the British constitution, so a new law to define and authorise the vote would be required. I can't imagine it could be passed in an afternoon, as is theoretically possible. It would be fought tooth and nail, and arguments about advisory and binding results, and thresholds for turnout and majority, would be made with more force (and attention) than they were in 2015.

According to the stipulations of the act and the question to be asked, campaigns would have to be constituted and submitted to the electoral commission for designation. You would expect the government to be at the heart of the campaign for its deal. Would there be a freebooter campaign for No Deal? There would be a Remain organisation, and separate party or other groups to make the electoral commission's job more interesting. Much more attention would be given to funding than in 2016. And finally the campaign itself. Could a vote take place less than three months after the law was passed?

An alternative, often touted in these conversations, would be an election. But that could only do the job if parties offered distinct and opposing policies on the issue. Several small Remain parties taking on two versions of a Leave-with-a-deal-and-then... campaign would hardly be credible.

And all this would take place against the backdrop of the EU doing... what? Approving a withdrawal agreement which might be about to be thrown away? Preparing guidelines for the continuing negotiation during transition? Finalising the next multi-annual financial framework on the assumption that the UK would not be part of it? Or allowing for the possibility that we might be? Would our newly energised parliament demand the extension of the Article 50 process? Would the EU27 tell us to go away and stop wasting their time?

There are certainly polls which report public support for another vote, but there are a few others which don't. Commentators claim to identify a "just get on with it" mood, which could swell the Leave vote or the abstentions - there would certainly be people arguing that the "will of the people" can only be used once - and a "plague on all your houses" sentiment could develop, leaving us with a low turnout and an unsatisfactory result.

I still think Brexit is the wrong thing, being done badly, that it will harm us economically, reduce our status in the world, and I have a lot of sympathy for the argument that what started with democracy should end with democracy, that we should make a final, informed decision when we know what "Brexit means Brexit" means. But it's not easy. It needs turning into much more than a slogan rather quickly.

Wednesday, 7 March 2018

Tell us what you know



One result of May's Road To Brexit speech must surely be that her "preferred option", her detailed specification of a Red White And Blue Brexit, has now been run through the treasury model from which we have so far only seen leaked details. But one result we should not expect is actually to see that forecast.

There must be hundreds of assessments of the impact that Brexit will have on individual companies, sectors, regions, countries and international economies. Many of these are in the public domain, and they almost all say the same thing as each other and as the leaked results of the government model - that Brexit will reduce the UK's economic activity more or less. The only exceptions are those few produced by declared pro-Brexiters, which don't seem to use respectable assumptions (see reviews here and here).

But forecasts are always wrong, retort the usual suspects whenever a microphone or a camera presents itself. Iain Duncan Smith could probably recite the script in his sleep. Steve Baker got into trouble for basically calling his own department's civil servants dishonest and Jacob Rees-Mogg puts on his serious face and turns his voice down half an octave. The Treasury used to produce forecasts, he tells us, but they were always politically biased (in fact ministers more or less crudely changed the figures they produced) so the independent Office for Budget Responsibility came into being. If the Treasury is producing forecasts again this can only be a bad thing, Rees-Mogg invites us to agree.

A useful maxim I've encountered in other areas is "All models are wrong, but some are useful", attributed to the British statistician George Box. Every model is wrong because it's a simplification of reality, but simplifications of reality can help us explain, predict and understand the world, whether in economics, bubble physics or climate science. A map is a very wrong model of the world, but good maps are very useful (with thanks to a discussion on StackExchange).

What model are the government's new forecasts based on? It's a new one, produced in response to economists' failure to foresee the global crash in 2008. As Chris Giles tells it in the Financial Times (£) "the government economic service... has built a computable general equilibrium model of the sort that all countries use in trade negotiations. It has more computational heft and uses more data than the Treasury brought to bear in its pre-referendum assessment of the long-term effects of Brexit".

And Philip Hammond has been telling everybody about his model. In response to questions from Catherine McKinnell at the Treasury select committee last October, he explained, "The Treasury is working with DExEU, DIT and the Home Office on a cross-departmental model... to model different scenarios. It is a wholly new model... that is continually being refined... The  model has the capability to look at countries and sectors". However, Hammond told us it was "internal work at the moment, which is being shared by the four Departments that are most intimately involved" and "We are not planning to publish this work".

In her hastily rearranged speech last Friday, Theresa May told us "existing models [of Brexit] do not provide the best way forward for either the UK or the EU. But before I turn to what a new and better model might look like, I want to be straight with people – because the reality is that we all need to face up to some hard facts". The facts she has no intention of giving us are what she thinks her approach to Brexit will do to the economy.

Is that being straight with people?

Do we have to leave it to the courts?





Tuesday, 6 March 2018

If you are going to do this damn silly thing, don’t do it in this damn silly way


We begin with the words of that most educational of civil servants, Sir Humphrey Appleby, and move on.

"So the politics of Brexit are truly remarkable not just because Brexit polarises opinion more deeply than perhaps any issue in modern British history but because it does so in a particular way. Brexit policy has taken a form that demands the impossible and requires those who know it is impossible to implement it. It is overseen by someone who presumably thinks that it is possible in this form, but doesn’t appear to believe that it is desirable. Meanwhile it is proclaimed as the sacred Will of the People who magically knew what they voted for two years ago, even though it was only last week that the government precariously agreed what that was. And what we end up with will certainly be different to what the government wants, because that’s impossible to deliver, but whatever it turns out to be it would be an affront to democracy to ask the people to vote on whether or not they agree to it."

Chris Grey puts things so well that it makes me wonder why I bother with this blog. I can only plead that I sometimes make connections he doesn't (not that he couldn't) and this morning it's worth looking at Rachel Sylvester in the Times, who writes, "It is becoming clearer by the day that Theresa May is leading the country towards a Brexit that she does not truly believe is in the national interest, even though she sees it as her duty to implement it. This is an extraordinary position for a prime minister to be in, psychologically as well as politically. There is no precedent for a leader consciously embarking on a course that they know will make their people poorer and less safe."

Both writers recall the words of Jonathan Edwards MP (Plaid Cymru, Camarthen East and Dinefwr) in the Commons yesterday: "Following the Prime Minister’s speech on Friday, she was asked by a journalist, 'Is Brexit worth it?'. She failed to give a direct answer; will she answer today? Is Brexit worth it: yes or no?". At the despatch box May replied in the affirmative readily enough, but this is not the first time her commitment has been in doubt.

Towards the end of last year's election Corbyn and May (both, publicly, Remain voters) had to face Jeremy Paxman on Channel 4. I reproduce what I wrote at the time: "May was asked 'When did  you change your mind on the biggest issue of the day (Brexit)?', then 'Are you trying to achieve something that you think is bad for us?'.  (Both questions are rendered approximately but fairly, I hope.)  And she wouldn't say that she had changed her mind on Brexit, or that she actually believed in it now, only that she believes in 'making a success of it'". And yet again, two days later, when she had gathered her thoughts...




I first really came across Matthew Parris when he tried to live on the dole for a week in 1984 and found he couldn't do it. Since then he's often made me shout at the radio, but he sometimes comes up with good questions. His opinion piece from the Times of 3 February 2018 seems relevant here.

"Wickedness may not always lie in the carrying forward of bad projects. It may also lie in allowing oneself to be carried forward by them, knowing their wrongfulness. Perhaps that is the more culpable, for zealots at least believe their madness. A special kind of guilt attaches to the sane majority of the Conservative Party today. It is written across their faces."


Sunday, 4 March 2018

Come together? We're still here


"It’s an insult to the people of Britain to demand that we 'come together' to support a Brexit that almost half who voted did not want, and in a form that more than half of them certainly don’t want" writes Professor Chris Grey in one of his invaluable Brexit chronicles (my emphasis).

No, this is not "Leave voters didn't know what they were voting for". This is asking who May has behind her in the Brexit she's trying to construct. Media attention this weekend is on whether the Tory soft-Brexiters and the headbangers are reconciled by May's 45 minutes at a Mansion House lectern, but should the concern not be for the preferences of "the British people", to coin a phrase?

Six weeks ago, George Osborne's London Evening Standard quoted a poll for "website Left Foot Forward" which found 60% support for remaining in the single market and 57% support for the customs union. Even 44% of those who voted Leave in 2016 supported single market membership. The actual numbers are on the BMG website.

And yet, to quote May's speech, "We are leaving the single market".


This is far from the only recent poll which gives a similar picture. When the question reminds respondents that the single market includes free movement the score goes down; when they're offered some form of reform of free movement the single market is more popular, but membership of the EU's internal market is still there as an option.

Tom Newton Dunn claimed on Radio 4's Week in Westminster on Saturday that the subject of the customs union wasn't mentioned in the 2016 campaign, at which Jacob Rees Mogg protested that we obviously hadn't been listening to his speeches. Clearly not.

Later that year Liam Fox told Andrew Marr that the customs union was still being considered: "The UK may seek a compromise deal to remain in the EU customs union... the cabinet would 'take a collective view on this once we have looked at all the issues'". January's BMG figures suggest that people are willing to consider it.

And yet, to quote May's speech: "The UK has been clear it is leaving the Customs Union".


But everybody knew that voting Leave meant leaving the single market!
Not those who wanted an EEA Brexit.

And everybody knew we'd be leaving the customs union!
Perhaps not the majority who missed those Rees Mogg speeches.

But Cameron told us!
This from those who didn't believe another word the then prime minister uttered.

Two weeks after the referendum vote in 2016, Comres ran a poll on what people expected to happen. David Cameron had resigned and we had no prime minister; the Tory leadership election was well under way but Andrea Leadsom had still to drop out of the contest. People were asked who they trusted to "carry out the will of the British people" and answered:

A few questions later they were asked what kind of new deal they expected. Looking just at the single market (the customs union wasn't considered in this poll)...


As you can see, fewer than 30% expected to leave the single market (35% of Leave voters).

Chris Grey's two sentences before the one I opened with are: "The most depressing aspect of it, as with the Florence speech, was the sub-text that it would be better for Britain not to leave the EU at all or, at least, to do so whilst staying within the EEA. It is a terrible, tragic failure of political leadership that a British PM is enacting a policy which is not only harmful to Britain but which she clearly realises is harmful to Britain."

So, come together? We haven't gone anywhere.


Friday, 2 March 2018

Brexit - the sonic screwdriver approach


Michel Barnier, walking the border
between Ireland and Northern Ireland
with representatives of the Irish government
One of the big questions raised by this week's draft withdrawal agreement (and a hundred documents and meetings before it) is "How do we avoid a return to the borders of the past?". Or, as it's normally put now: "How do we avoid a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland?". All sides have stated that they want the border to continue to be as open as it is today and, as we know, if "everybody wants it" and "it's in everybody's interests" then it will happen.

Theresa May was interrogated on the subject by the House of Commons Liaison Committee - a daunting assembly of the chairs of all the Commons select committees (though there are usually only about a dozen of them on any particular occasion). As the Times reported, "Asked about her government’s plans to avoid a hard border the British prime minister refused to rule out the use of cameras to monitor people and goods between the Republic and the North". But then "Pressed by Yvette Cooper, a senior Labour MP and chairwoman of the home affairs committee, on whether she could confirm numberplate recognition would not be used, Mrs May said: 'We have said that there will be no physical infrastructure in relation to Northern Ireland. We have put forward a number of suggestions as to how we think that border issue can be addressed'".


Those suggestions can be found in papers issued last summer on customs arrangements and specifically Northern Ireland and Ireland. A major suggestion for the border is what's usually referred to as "technology", which is taken to mean online registration of shipments, with VAT and customs duties being treated as an accounting process, plus the recognition of the largest companies as "trusted traders" who are assumed not to need stopping for customs checks.

That doesn't cover everyone of course, and former Taoiseach Bertie Ahern sums the scheme up as follows (see Give the impression of doing no work until it's far too late): "Our economy is relatively small, a huge amount of the trade is multinationals; it should be possible, I think, to do that by technology," Then: "But of course, when you come down to agriculture and smaller items, I don’t think technology would work. One thing we do not want, can’t have, is back to a physical border.” And then: "Theresa May, take her at her word, she’s confidently said she doesn't want a physical border, the EU don’t want a physical border, the Irish Government don’t. So you’re left down with the one alternative — to make technology work in most cases and to throw a blind eye to those areas that can’t come in within technology". The number of border crossings which would have to attract the blind eye (though obviously not the volume or value of goods in transit) has been estimated at 80%.

The proposals have been rejected as inadequate, unworkable or "magical thinking" by the Irish government and EU negotiators, probably because there is little detail. Brexiters pour scorn on this, accusing everybody of just being negative. After all, they say, other countries have frictionless borders - look at Switzerland and its neighbours, Norway and Sweden, Canada and the USA. They don't always recognise that Switzerland has free movement and is in the Schengen zone (people cross borders as well as goods) and has a raft of bilateral agreements replicating much of the single market and easing customs. Neither do they mention that both Norway and Sweden are inside the single market. And how frictionless are those borders anyway?



That's a border post. You know, the kind that nobody wants on the Irish border. "Zollabfertigung" means "customs clearance". The evidence that Hoey and the rest of the committee heard from the head of Swiss customs demonstrated that the vast majority of personal travel between Switzerland and its neighbours involves no stopping, and the vast majority of trade is done by pre-notification, trusted traders, risk assessment and technology, like cameras and ANPR. That's the vast majority, not all. There are stops, there are checks, and occasionally there are follow-ups away from the border.

But, the Brexiters cry, the EU itself has done the work... and they refer to a report called Smart Border 2.0 - Avoiding a hard border on the island of Ireland for Customs control and the free movement of persons. It's not clear that they've read it though. 

(Incidentally, another Brexiter line is that neither Ireland nor the UK wants a border at all; it's "the EU forcing Ireland to erect checkpoints". However, this favoured report says "the withdrawal of the UK from the EU will create a requirement for some form of border controls on both sides of the Irish border" which presumably refers to the international legal context as set out in the rather technical Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947) which effectively states that either you have a border or you form part of a customs union.)

Smart Border 2.0 seems a good report, with useful data such as numbers of person and vehicle movements across the border, and studies such as the Swiss, Norwegian etc cases mentioned above. But what it sees as eliminating a "hard border" seems rather different from May & co's idea. To take the list of features from the executive summary (comments in round brackets come from elsewhere in the report) and [comments in square brackets are my additions]:

Free Movement of persons under CTA (Common Travel Area):
  • Free movement lanes at major border crossings for eligible people covered under CTA (special lanes at major crossings, minor crossings completely open)
  • Use of enhanced driver's licenses [this is a US notion; is it relevant here?] and RFID (Radio Frequency Identification Device) capabilities [the range at which such devices can be read varies with the chosen technology]
  • Use of ANPR (Automatic Number Plate Recognition) at manned and unmanned border crossings (for example, at unmanned crossings to identify vehicles which should present at a manned border crossing) 
  • Requirement for people not eligible under CTA to present at a manned border crossing (if such a person uses another crossing they're considered to have entered illegally)
  • One check: at jurisdiction of entry [I assume this means that everything can always be done at the border]
  • Creation of a frequent travellers program for people not eligible under the CTA
  • Legal basis for collaboration and data exchange between Ireland and Northern Ireland/UK
Create a low-friction border for the movement of goods by:
  • A bilateral EU-UK agreement regulating an advanced Customs cooperation that avoids duplication and where UK and Irish Customs can undertake inspections on behalf of each other
  • Mutual recognition of Authorized Economic Operators (AEO)
  • A Customs-to-Customs technical agreement on exchange of risk data
  • Pre-registration of operators (AEO) and people (Commercial Travellers programme in combination with a Certified Taxable Person programme)
  • Identification system by the border
  • A Single Window (this is an international standard for information management between the private sector and government in relation to import and export) with one-stop-shop-elements (coordinated border management approach where businesses, at import and/or export, have a single contact with one government agency also representing other agencies at the release of goods [I assume this would cover things like (phyto)sanitary checks on farm produce])
  • A Unique Consignment reference number (UCR) (A specific number regulated by a standard from the World Customs Organization that follows a consignment through its life cycle in the global supply chain, making it possible for governments to identify and follow a specific consignment from a risk and compliance perspective)
  • A simplified Customs declaration system (100% electronic) with re-use of export data for imports
  • Mobile Control and Inspection Units
  • Technical surveillance of border (CCTV, ANPR etc)
A Swiss border crossing
There's a lot of technology there, and lots of structures to be designed, implemented and staffed, but the report does talk in terms of it being available by March 2019, and also serving as a model for future UK/EU working, so I'll leave that for now. For the purposes of this post I'll just point out that here we have:
  • manned crossings
  • free movement lanes (and therefore other lanes where you have to stop)
  • radio frequency readers for people via their passports, and for goods
  • ANPR and CCTV
This is infrastructure at the border - quite a lot of it - including several items which the UK government has said will not be present, or Northern Irish representatives have said must not be there.

Then there are significant logistical and legal agreements, including:
  • an agreement that UK and Irish Customs can undertake inspections on each other's behalf
  • mobile control and inspection units (at the Swiss border the two countries' people can operate on either side of the border; they even have helicopters)
When these measures were mentioned in the evidence session with Swiss and Norwegian customs staff, eyebrows were raised and committee members expressed some doubt that they were appropriate for this case.

In addition there are several requirements for data sharing, which in other areas raises the question of which legal jurisdiction is to be used, and which court or other body is required to settle disputes.

This is an idea of "smart borders" that claims to bring together international standards, best practice and new technologies to create low-friction borders that support fast and secure movement of persons and goods. Coordinated border management, with trusted trader and trusted traveller programmes, it says, can significantly reduce compliance requirements and make borders almost friction free [my emphasis]. That sounds very much like the Swiss or Norwegian/Swedish borders, or even the idea presented to cabinet by Boris Johnson (and then publicly rejected by his boss) which considered: "Even if a hard border is reintroduced, we would expect to see 95% + of goods pass the border [without] checks."

It doesn't sound quite like the Irish border someone ordered.

And finally

Why did I mention a sonic screwdriver? Robert Shrimsley in the Financial Times wonders whether Boris Johnson, Michael Gove and other leading Brexiters are big fans of Dr Who, because he observes "much evidence of sonic screwdriver strategy (the all-purpose get out of jail free card for scriptwriters) in their thinking. Their mystical faith in technological solutions is most obvious in discussions about the Irish border". If you can get round the paywall, it's worth a read.


Sunday, 25 February 2018

Deep, special and ambitious managed divergence


Cabinet members arrive (at some speed) at the Chequers
front gate
War cabinet is a snappier name than European Union Exit and Trade (Strategy and Negotiations) Subcommittee but a depressing one nonetheless ("dreamy nickname" anybody?) Who's supposed to like the short name? People who think about Brexit in World War 2 terms? Who's not supposed to like it? EU27 heads of government who think of the EU partly in terms of preventing war? Who invented the term? The idiot Boris Johnson who still seems to think at least partly in headlines, or somebody in the media who at least is supposed to? More interestingly, are people aware that those people on the other side of the table actually read our papers?

T
Olly Robbins Europe Adviser to the Prime Minister
The subcommittee gathered at Theresa May's prime ministerial retreat last Thursday to work out what Brexit might mean, what kind of future relationship to seek in the remaining eight months of negotiation. According to Tim Shipman in the Sunday Times, the plan they came up with (which was the plan May went in with, though she gave it to her top Brexit civil servant Olly Robbins to present), the position that has led to so much manoeuvring and low-level blood-letting in recent weeks is to
  • Demand mutual recognition of standards for goods traded between the UK and the EU
  • Make a public commitment that British standards will remain as high as those of the EU
  • Pledge to keep rules and regulations “substantially similar”
  • Insist upon the creation of a dispute mechanism to oversee areas where the UK wants to diverge from EU regulations — and that the European Court of Justice would have no role in it
To which I can only say, Is that it? Isn't that just a restatement of the three baskets idea which the EU side has rejected as cherry picking?  A narrative description of this "ambitious managed divergence" is more telling: "We are going to be associate members of various agencies on things like aviation, chemicals and pharmaceuticals and then we get [EU] market access and don’t need to have our products checked in more than one jurisdiction. We can decide at any time, in the full knowledge that there are consequences, that we don’t want to be regulated in this way" which seems just a little naive and/or presumptuous.

One particular disagreement Shipman mentions was between Greg Clark, the business secretary, and Boris Johnson, still astonishingly our foreign secretary. Clark "gave a presentation on the consequences of divergence for the car industry" and Johnson stressed that "divergence was essential to ensure innovation".

Honda's plant in Swindon
I'd normally refer to Nissan on the subject of Brexit and the automotive industry, but let's talk Honda for a change. Patrick Keating, Government Affairs Manager for Honda Motor Europe, told the Commons business select committee last November that the company "would need clarity" by March this year on "what happens to the customs border". It would be "a year-long process between deciding we need to invest in additional warehousing and going through zoning, planning and investment" plus "internal decision-making procedures and the need to get clearance from Japan".

In addition, Honda is concerned about "regulation, and particularly type approvals". Talking to the EU Commission, said Mr Keating "there is a real risk that, as the UK leaves the single market, the type approvals issued by the... UK Vehicle Certification Agency, will either no longer hold validity or not be able to be extended". As we've heard recently this is a real problem - at Brexit "the United Kingdom approval authority [VCA] will cease to be an EU type-approval authority".

The Japanese ambassador to the UK accompanied a party of Japanese businessmen to No 10 on 8 February and was "unusually candid" afterwards in the view of several commentators: "If there is no profitability of continuing operations in the UK - not Japanese only - then no private company can continue operations. It is as simple as that. This is all high stakes that all of us, I think, need to keep in mind." Days later, Honda's management in Swindon stressed that the company "remains committed to our operations in the UK and Europe" and declared "we are working closely with the government to ensure the best conditions for our business following the UK’s exit from the European Union".

Greg Clark, Secretary of State for Business,
Energy and Industrial Strategy 
Honda don't want to have to build new warehousing or relocate their type approval people, and neither do they want to move production, not least because they have no similar plant elsewhere in the EU. Any of these things would cost money that's not in their current plans. They will be making full use of their contacts in London and Brussels to get some of that precious clarity by the end of next month - the EU Council meeting on 22-23 March might be the target date.

That kind of mundane stuff was no doubt part of Greg Clark's presentation, but Johnson countered with his characteristic bluntness. As Shipman puts it, "Johnson interrupted to say divergence was essential to ensure innovation. He cited the way EU rules had stopped him changing the design of lorries in London while he was mayor to make conditions safer for cyclists".

It's one of his favourite moans about EU regulation, but it has the disadvantage of being untrue. Johnson wants changes like wrap-round windows and mirrors to eliminate blind spots which have killed cyclists and the new features are likely to be with us soon. As Euractiv reported in 2014, member states held out against a series of changes to lorry design standards under pressure from their own manufacturers (and the Financial Times suggests the UK was one of them). It takes a long time to redesign a lorry, or a new set of standards, so there's constant to-ing and fro-ing between manufacturers, politicians and regulators. In the end the delay was reduced and“We did manage to force EU governments to agree to the introduction of a new and safer lorry-cab design, although only as of 2019,” said Keith Taylor, transport spokesman for the Greens in the European Parliament.

Political nitty-gritty too intruded into Chequers' panelled rooms, with chief whip Julian Smith warning of the "real, real danger" of Tory rebels voting with Labour to keep Britain in the customs union while David Davis pointed to hardliners threatening to force a leadership election if May drops her opposition to a customs union. Rees-Mogg's position at the head of the European Research Group "is a sign that they are militarising and have tanks on our lawn," said one of Shipman's sources.

Karen Bradley
Karen Bradley, the Northern Ireland secretary, told May she could not be sure her DUP allies would "turn up" for key votes. There was even talk of Sinn Fein’s seven MPs taking their seats if the UK fails to prevent a hard border between Northern Ireland and the republic.

Some Eurosceptics outside the cabinet put little faith in May and her team holding their fragile truce together in the face of "intransigence" in Brussels. "Cabinet continues to live in a parallel universe," one is reported to have said. "The DD-May plan is doomed. Barnier will smash DD [David Davis] over the head and No 10 will fold as always." And remember, even after May's next speech, scheduled for Friday 1 May, the full cabinet will never have discussed and approved the approach. They will simply be expected to go along with it.

Thursday, 22 February 2018

Chequers away-day -- how to solve Brexit in a country house



Theresa May opens the discussion
















Amber Rudd counters a point from Michael Gove









As discussions unfold, unusual alliances begin to form around the cabinet table








Boris Johnson and Philip Hammond engage in close debate








Having met his match in argument, Sajid Javid is helped to the station by long-suffering staff

Wednesday, 7 February 2018

All of the good bits and none of the bad bits... please


Bernard Jenkin MP, chair of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Select Committee in the Commons, was quoted this morning as saying "It would be utterly perverse for the EU to impose tariffs on trade between the UK and the European Union and I don't think they would be so destructive [as] to do that".

He was interviewed with Ken Clarke (there to play the soft Brexit to Jenkin's hard) on the Radio 4 Today programme about a letter from the British Chamber of Commerce. The BCC's Director General Adam Marshall was warning the prime minister that "patience is wearing thin" - business is exasperated by the lack of a unified government position on a future UK-EU relationship.

The current live issue is customs, with May rejecting future membership of either the current EU customs union or a possible alternative customs union such as the EU has with Turkey or a smaller country like Andorra. She will happily discuss a customs arrangement or a customs partnership of course, as discussed in a paper the government published last August (it was labelled "magical thinking" by EU commentators and seemed to be quietly forgotten, but has been rediscovered with a new year).

Swiss borders with EU countries -
much of regular trade is handled digitally
but there are still checks. 
Jenkin's point is frequently argued - if a barrier to trade follows Brexit it's the EU's fault, because the UK has no intention of doing anything against our joint interests. Two points there:
  • None of this would be happening without a decision to leave the EU; it's May's Article 50 letter that started it all.
  • What would bring about barriers to trade would be failure to reach an agreement which eliminates them, plus the automatic operation of WTO rules. If there is no UK-EU Free Trade Agreement, the EU is duty bound to apply the same tariffs, quotas etc as it does to any other country with Most Favoured Nation status.
Then there's the Irish border, which Brexiters claim will be exactly as easy and open as it is now unless the Republic or, more likely, "the EU" decide to make it difficult.

But again, we started it, and May intends to take us out of the legal system which makes the border no more than a notional line on a map. All sorts of organisational and technological wheezes could be used to ease the waits, but without an agreement otherwise there will be a border, and EU law and WTO rules will require it to be managed.

Moving beyond tariffs, there are non-tariff barriers (NTBs) - differences in regulation and Rules of Origin. If May's customs arrangement, partnership or wotsit doesn't cover how UK-made and EU-made products are counted for onward export, and if she insists on retaining the right to diverge from EU rules, or fails to reach an agreement at all, there will be barriers. Who will have raised them? The EU won't have changed anything but we'll have become a third country, we'll have put ourselves outside the walls.

Everybody's looking to barriers between the UK and EU, but there are also hundreds of agreements we have with other countries as a member of the EU. Some are full Free Trade Agreements (like the one which guarantees Dan Hannan his tariff-free Chilean wine) and some just harmonisation of testing standards, but many of them are there to ease trade. As Fionna O'Leary points out, there are 142 with our largest single trading partner, the USA, of which around 50 have an impact on trade. If we fail to carry those over, by agreement with the EU and the US as necessary, are we going to blame the US for "erecting barriers to trade"?






Letter to the Laura Kuenssberg programme - Farage, Musk and "free speech"

Dear Ms Kuenssberg, I hear from BBC TV and Radio News that you will this morning be giving a platform to Nigel Farage to defend attacks on t...